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The Iowa legislature debated whether to change its utility disconnection
policy. The debate centered around three questions: 1) whether family
size or income influences energy consumption; 2) whether elderly people
consume more energy than families; and 3) whether energy subsidies
foster increased energy use and energy waste. This paper reports energy
consumption patterns for a sample of low income people. Economic
demand theory predicts that energy consumption will increase as income
increases. This hypothesis was statistically rejected. Second, legislators
assumptions about energy consumption were formulated into hypotheses.
These hypotheses were statistically rejected.
Public Policy and the Energy Needs
of Low Income Families
Energy price increases during the 1970's affected the ability
of low income people to pay utility bills. Customer disconnec-
tions increased as the arrearages for utility companies climbed.
The problem of arrearages and disconnections led to a public
policy debate: should government meet the energy needs of low
income people through the regulatory function or through the
welfare function? States implemented a variety of energy protec-
tion mechanisms to deal with the arrearage and disconnection
problem: disconnection moratoriums; rate relief; spreading the
cost of unpaid bills across all customers; checkoff programs; and
mandatory budget billing. This paper reports energy consump-
tion patterns for a sample of low income people. Finally, the
paper applies the study findings to energy policy options.
Public Policy Debate
The Iowa legislature was under pressure to change its util-
ity disconnection policy. There was considerable dissatisfaction
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with the disconnection moratorium which protected customers
from energy disconnection during high consumption months
from November through March. Utility companies were dissat-
isfied because they were holding millions of dollars in unpaid
gas and electric bills. Human needs advocates were dissatisfied
because customers had no protection after March 31. Further,
once a customer was disconnected, the utility company usually
would not reconnect service until the arrearage and a service
deposit were paid.
But legislators found it difficult to formulate policy. First,
consumer lobbyists supported proposals quite different from
lobbyists for utility companies. Second, none of the proposals
provided sufficient data about the number of people who would
be affected, or the projected fiscal cost of each proposal. As
the debate continued, legislators began to ask questions about
the cost of energy subsidies, energy consumption patterns, and
energy conservation.
The debate centered around three researchable questions:
1) whether family size or family income influences consump-
tion; 2) whether elderly people in single family homes consume
more energy than families in similar dwellings; and 3) whether
energy subsidies foster increased energy use and energy waste.
This study empirically tests the validity of policy maker as-
sumptions. We collected income and consumption data to sta-
tistically test the questions and hypotheses expressed by policy
makers, particularly whether low income people have special
characteristics which influence energy consumption.
Energy Protection Models
Low income families typically reside in housing which has
not been adequately weatherized from wind, cold and precip-
itation. Energy costs can constitute a considerable portion of
a poor family's income. In the tier of states known as the frost
belt, an estimated 25 million poor people spend up to 20 percent
of "after tax" income on energy (Cullen, et. al., 1983).
When poor people spend a significant portion of income
on energy, they must reduce consumption for food, clothing
and medical care (Cullen, et. al., 1983). Unlike other consumer
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goods, a family can not shop for a secondhand cubic foot of gas
or a slightly used kilowatt of electricity. All a poor family can
do is try to consume less energy (Deerwester, 1987).
Rate relief was proposed for helping low income people
obtain sufficient energy. The lifeline model (a form of rate
relief) would provide a minimum number of kilowatts for cus-
tomers on low or fixed incomes, and a special rate for this use
(Lawrence, 1979). The model assumed that income has a strong,
positive effect on demand. Therefore a lifeline rate would "sub-
sidize" use by low-income people and "tax" use by high-income
customers.
Two problems emerged with the lifeline model. First, it was
electricity based, and most people in the frost belt use natural
gas to heat homes or apartments. Therefore, the lifeline model
would not help most low income people with overall energy
costs. Second, researchers found that electricity use varies for
reasons largely unrelated to income (Burgess and Paglin, 1981).
Utility companies and economists generally opposed rate
shifts on the basis they distort the market and lead to wasteful
use (Scott, 1981). Utility companies argued that rate prefer-
ences for low income people "are a subsidy" (Davis, 1982:197).
Economists concluded that income transfers are easier and
cheaper to administer, as well as more effective in reaching the
target population, than rate relief (Aaron and Von Furstenberg,
1971; Berg and Roth, 1976; Burgess and Paglin, 1981).
Another model to help utility companies and customers deal
with energy costs is the Guaranteed Service Plan (GSP). The
GSP model helps low-income people pay current energy costs
while also making payments toward arrearages from unpaid
bills. A GSP guarantees that a customer who makes regular
payments of a specified amount to the utility company will
not be disconnected. These payments cover energy costs and
arrearage payments. Common payment thresholds are 10 or 15
or 20 percent of a customer's annual income.
A critical element of the GSP model involves writing off
arrearages too large to be paid by a low income family. A
GSP limits current energy costs and limits arrearages to keep
the total cost burden within a designated percentage of a fam-
ily's income. Once a GSP plan is established for a customer,
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the arrearage amount does not grow, even if current energy
costs exceed the payment plan. Utility companies, regulators
and poverty advocates concluded that the GSP model can be
effective. This occurs because the shortfall between utility bills
and manageable GSP payments does not significantly differ
from the bad debt which companies currently write off (Colton
and Hill, 1987).
Method
This study is based on a sample of 483 households ran-
domly selected from more than 11,000 Polk County households
receiving help from the federally financed Low Income Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP). In Iowa, any family below 150
percent of poverty is eligible. Approximately half the eligible
people apply for a subsidy.
The study collected de-identified household data from the
LIHEAP application. Utility companies generated a monthly gas
and electric consumption statement for each LIHEAP house-
hold. Households using deliverable fuels were excluded. En-
ergy data was analyzed for the six month heating season-
from November 1 through March 31. This period is the high
consumption season, and fits both the seasonal disconnection
moratorium as well as a "guaranteed service program" model.
The study uses income and consumption data to examine
the energy consumption patterns of low income people. The
study also calculated the common GSP thresholds ("percent of
income spent on energy") of 10, 15 and 20 percent of income.
The legislative debate about the possible influences of house-
hold characteristics such as family size and family income led us
to include several of these independent variables in the study to
determine if they were good predictors of seasonal energy use.
The selected variables were: annual family income; number of
persons in the household; single versus multi-unit dwellings;
number of preschool children; elderly families; and amount of
the LIHEAP grant.
Findings
Data analysis begins by examining energy consumption for
households and then proceeds to test whether there are con-
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sumption differences between households in the various GSP
thresholds. We then test for energy consumption differences
for different types of households. Finally, data analysis tested
which variables make a statistically significant contribution to
energy consumption.
The utility company provided total consumption data for all
residential customers served by the company. Natural gas con-
sumption by LIHEAP households in the sample is comparable
to consumption by all residential users. The "table of means" for
income and energy consumption in Table 1 contains the income
distribution and gas consumption for Polk County households.
The category Polk is all Polk County households. The category
LIHEAP is all LIHEAP households for the sample. The remain-
ing categories contain households which fit the "percentage of
income categories."
The typical LIHEAP household in Table 1 consumed 989
CCF for the heating season, about 5 percent higher than the
941 CCF consumed by the typical residential household buying
energy from the utility company. The typical LIHEAP house-
hold consumed 80 percent of its annual gas usage during the
six-month heating season. Seasonal electric consumption rep-
resented 54 percent of annual use. We computed correlation
coefficients to test the relationship between income and gas con-
sumption. The correlation coefficient (..071) between income and
gas consumption did not fit the usual economic assumptions for
market behavior, i.e., household income for the sample does not
predict gas use.
We then tested to determine whether there are differences
between the consumption patterns of households in the various
thresholds for GSP categories ("percent of income spent on
energy"). We want to note however, that household income-
and percent of income spent on energy (GSP categories)-are
two quite different variables.
For this sample, energy (gas and electric) consumption in-
creases as the "percent of income spent on energy" increases.
The differences between energy consumption for households
in the 20 percent category versus households in both the 10
percent and 15 percent categories were significant at the .01
level. Households spending more than 20 percent of annual
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Table 1
Liheap and Polk County Households Income by Seasonal
Gas Consumption
Seasonal % Avg
Income CCF CCFUSE
Polk $36,842 941 100.0
LIHEAP 7,114 989 105.1
Liheap Households GSP Thresholds of Income Spent on Energy
By Seasonal Gas Consumption
Under 10% 9,340 813 86.3
10-15% Cat 5,471 975 103.6
15-20% Cat 4,891 1302 138.4
Over 20% Cat 3,849 1680 178.5
income on energy averaged 1680 CCF; households in the 10-15
percent category averaged 975 CCF; households in the category
under 10 percent averaged 813 CCF.
Income and energy consumption for households in the "per-
centage of income categories" are negatively related. LIHEAP
households with heating season energy bills exceeding 20 per-
cent of annual income have lower income and higher energy use
than those in the other categories. These households used more
gas than either the typical sample household or the typical Polk
County customer. We also tested to determine if differences in
seasonal electrical consumption contribute to variation between
the categories. The hypothesis was rejected. Further analysis
showed there is minimal difference in electrical consumption
between households in the 10 percent of income category and
those in the 20 percent of income category: $274 and $279
respectively.
Every household in the 20 percent category had income
below the 100 percent poverty level (less than $8,850 for a family
of three). This group had an average annual income of $3,849,
which is only 10.5 percent of the average household income
($36,842) for Polk County. Income for this group was 54 percent
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of the average income ($7,114) for all LIHEAP households.
Families living in multi-unit dwellings receive lower LI-
HEAP grants than families in detached houses. The LIHEAP
rules assume that apartments are cheaper to heat than houses.
We tested the hypothesis that families in detached houses
consume more energy than families in apartment units. This
hypothesis was rejected. The outcome was opposite the pre-
dicted direction.
The energy consumption difference between detached units
and apartment units for all LIHEAP families in Table 2 was
significant (T-test) at the .01 level. The difference between de-
tached units and apartment units for families in the 20% of
income category was significant (T-test) at the .01 level.
We then looked at gas consumption rates for families which
fell into the "20 percent of income category" compared with
the average for all families. Families in detached houses had
seasonal gas consumption 32% greater than the average for all
families in like units for the sample. Families in apartment units
had seasonal gas consumption 166% greater than the average
for all families in like units for the sample.
Table 2
Seasonal Gas Consumption in Attached and Detached Dwellings
Attached
Detached (Apartment)
Consumption All Households (CCF) 1009 1036
Consumption 20% Households (CCF) 1333 2755
During legislative debate, policy makers questioned
whether family composition affects energy consumption. They
particularly wondered whether people who are home all day-
the elderly, and families with preschool children-consume
excessive energy. We tested the hypothesis that elderly peo-
ple consume more energy than other families in the sample.
This hypothesis was rejected. The outcome was opposite the
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predicted direction. Average heating season gas consumption
for LIHEAP households over age 60 was 962 CCF; average
heating season consumption for LIHEAP recipients under age
60 was 1007 CCF. The difference was significant (T-test) at
the .01 level. We then tested the hypothesis that families with
preschool children consume more energy than other families
in the sample. This hypothesis was accepted. Average heating
season gas consumption for LIHEAP households with preschool
children was 1041 CCF; average heating season consumption for
LIHEAP households with no preschool children was 972 CCF.
The difference was significant (T-test) at the .01 level.
The economic literature on utilities suggests that the in-
dependent variables income, LIHEAP grant and household
size are demand variables, and therefore predict energy con-
sumption. They also are continuous variables. The independent
variables of dwelling type, young children and elderly were
included in the equation because they reflect policy maker be-
liefs that these variables also influence consumption. These are
categorical variables in this data set.
The final step in our data analysis tested which independent
variables make a statistically significant contribution to energy
consumption. For this analysis, we used the stepwise regression
procedure to compute the regression equation for gas consump-
tion. The dependent variable for energy demand in Table 3 is
expressed as:
EU = Seasonal gas consumption
The independent variables in Table 3 are:
I = Annual family income in dollars
HH = Number of persons reported living in the house-
hold
Ll = LIHEAP grant in dollars
ATT = Whether dwelling is detached or multi-unit
YC = Number of preschool children
AGE60 = Elderly in home
Each independent variable in Table 3 was hypothesized
to have a positive effect on energy demand. Unexpectedly,
none of the independent variables predicts gas consumption
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Table 3
Demand Equation for Seasonal Gas Consumption
Correlation Coefficients
EU EU
1 .071
LI .065
HH .110
ATT - .018
YC .077
AGE60 - .074
Multiple R = .155 F = .966
R2 = .024 sig = .44
for this sample of low income families. In fact, the correlation
coefficients calculated in Table 3 for each of the variables are
barely above zero. This finding was unexpected since it seems
to negate (at least for this sample of low income households) the
expectations of economic demand theory. Nor does it fit with
the assumptions of policy makers. 1
Discussion and Implications
The findings provide important insight on energy consump-
tion by low income people. The analysis in this paper is based
on two separate models. First, economic demand theory predicts
that energy consumption will increase as income increases. This
hypothesis was statistically rejected. Second, legislators also
made certain assumptions about energy consumption. These
assumptions (proposed as policy guidelines) were formulated
into hypotheses. These hypotheses were statistically rejected.
The findings suggest that the choices of low income con-
sumers are not predictable when we consider energy demand
purely as function of income. First, as income declined, peo-
ple not only had less disposable income for energy costs, but
energy costs dramatically increased. Second, the low correla-
tion between LIHEAP and energy use indicates that energy
consumption does not increase with subsidy size. Thus, people
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with very low incomes use more energy. This does not mean
they are more wasteful than other people. Rather, we suspect
that they are more likely to live in houses converted to apart-
ments, substandard, poorly insulated buildings which do not
have the interior walls, ceilings and floors which help reduce
energy consumption. Therefore, services such as weatherization
or household relocation would produce greater savings.
Third, the findings confirm previous studies that the rate
relief model is not useful in meeting the heating needs of
low income people. Rate relief for natural gas would further
penalize households in the 20 percent of income category, the
poorest of the poor, for their poverty. Such households would
pay premium rates on consumption exceeding the "minimum
use," driving energy costs even higher.
Finally, a GSP for poor families would have to include both
the level of poverty, and percentage of income category in the
allocation system. LIHEAP funds are now divided among all
eligible households. Dollar awards vary depending on family
income, household size and whether the dwelling is a house
or apartment. Re-allocation would negatively impact on some
current recipients (for example, families from 125-150 percent
of poverty would have to be dropped from the program) to
adequately cover people in the lowest category and to prevent
budget shortfalls.
The public policy choices of legislators and utility regulators
about energy use were based on political or economic "common
sense" assumptions rather than data. But while "common sense
assumptions" may predict the behavior of some individuals,
they do not necessarily predict behavior for the target popu-
lation as a whole. This may appear self-evident to the reader,
but is not at all obvious in the heat of legislative debate. As
funds for social welfare programs tighten, policy makers will
be increasingly constrained to make policy decisions which
meet the needs and demands of one group at the expense
of another group. The efficient and effective allocation of eco-
nomic resources becomes increasingly important in difficult eco-
nomic times.
The findings for this study should encourage researchers
interested in examining social welfare policy. The findings sup-
port the idea that the assumptions and questions raised by
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policy makers during debate can be formulated as testable
hypotheses. Research does require some familiarity with the
welfare program under investigation. It also requires familiarity
with the major policy arguments. But with some effort, it is pos-
sible to collect and statistically test the data for these hypotheses.
Note
1. Even though electrical consumption does not significantly vary between
the heating season and the non-heating season, we tested whether any
of the independent variables make a statistically significant contribution
to electrical consumption. We used the stepwise regression procedure to
compute the regression equation for electrical consumption. Again, there
is almost no relationship between electrical consumption and the demand
variables income or LIHEAP grant. There is a moderate relationship be-
tween electrical consumption and household size.
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